The electoral triumph of the far right, embodied in the figure of Kast, is not a simple or mere contingency, but the inevitable historical consequence of the restoration process promoted after the Popular Revolt and led by practically the entire bloc of parties in power and backed by the elites and large economic groups that dominate these territories. This result confirms our thesis: the Boric government was never an alternative for change or transformation, nor was it a dam against the advance of the far right or fascistic forces; quite the contrary.
The FA-PC and Democratic Socialism (Boric) administration was not a bulwark against rising fascism, but rather the catalyst for its historic strengthening. Much of the people and popular sectors placed their hope in this government to lead substantive changes toward a better life, especially in the material and economic dimensions, in addition to the symbolic. This deep desire for change in living conditions was what gave it its initial legitimacy; it was the response to 30 years of injustice, indignity, exploitation, and marginalization; and the path opened up after the Popular Revolt and the institutional channel through which it took course.
The result, however, was massive frustration and defeat. The “left” administration not only abandoned the agenda for change, but moved in the opposite direction. In fact, the government devoted itself to social demobilization, shielding and consolidating the economic model in an attempt to please the owners of this country and their political agents. This translated into concrete actions such as the rescue of the ISAPRES (private health insurance companies), the reinforcement of the commercial education financing model through the FES (Education Fund), and the programmatic abandonment of structural reforms such as the dismantling of the AFPs (pension fund administrators). In addition, the capitulation of the Ministry of Women’s “feminist” agenda was evident in its failure to present a clear and consistent Free Abortion Law from the outset, among many other things.
Simultaneously, it promoted the extension of the police state, politically re-legitimizing the police and allocating unprecedented injections of economic resources. This reinforced police state, which has shown a total failure in combating organized and common crime, has nevertheless been deployed with force against the movement of unhoused people (especially land occupations), secondary school students, and other sectors that have demanded what this same government had promised. This was compounded by the militarization of Wallmapu, deepening the criminalization of the Mapuche struggle to levels never seen since the end of the dictatorship.
The shattered hopes of the working class—a de-ideologized (but not depoliticized) voting public that was deeply committed to supporting any initiative that promised to immediately improve their material living conditions—ended up strengthening the most populist and radical options on the right. The vacuum, despair, and frustration generated by the “betrayal” of the institutional left and its renunciation of the demands of the Revolt were effectively capitalized on by the reaction.
This failure, forged in the obvious evolution of Boric’s government, is currently affecting the entire so-called “progressive” bloc and the traditional left across the board. But we must be clear: for the people as a whole, the defeat and the perception of programmatic and practical “betrayal” does not distinguish flags as clearly as we would like. And we must also recognize that, broadly speaking as a revolutionary camp, we have not been able to substantially capitalize on the discontent and class rage in the face of this obvious grievance.
Given this, the challenge ahead of us is enormously important and complex: first, it means fighting against the deep disappointment and frustration that prevails at the popular grassroots level among the working class; second, it means confronting a right wing that has been greatly strengthened and emboldened by the election results to go on the offensive on multiple fronts; and third, it means resisting the political advance that the “progressive bloc” will attempt to regain the ground it has lost among the people, the working class, and social and popular movements. All this will take place amid the crisis of credibility and legitimacy of the party system, the elites, and even the model itself—the very crisis that sparked the outbreak and the revolt. The reconstruction of capitalist hegemony requires the political capitulation of the people and the stifling of their hunger for justice and dignity, something that, despite the setbacks, we do not foresee in any way.
In our view, the tactical horizon for reversing this situation involves class-based and mass organization around radical mobilization. Such mobilization must be centrally and primarily directed against the growing impoverishment of life and around the historical and contingent demands of the social groups, strata, and broad sectors most affected by economic exploitation, social oppression, and political domination. Within the framework of this effort, our strategic perspective makes perfect sense, as it is precisely about working to forge the class-based strength of the peoples and workers, through direct action and on the path to building an Autonomous Popular Movement in the territories and fronts of struggle, on the margins of and in direct confrontation with the politics of the rich, against Capital, the State, and Patriarchy.
★ LIBERACIÓN ★
Direct Action Against the State, Capitalism and Patriarchy!
Towards an Autonomous Popular Movement!
